Looking at Fedora Linux 33 bugs

Originally published at: Looking at Fedora Linux 33 bugs – Fedora Community Blog

At Nest, I delivered a talk called “Exploring Our Bugs“. But a single snapshot isn’t very useful. Building on the work there, let’s make this a regular thing. With the recent Fedora Linux 33 end-of-life, I’ve added F33 bugs to the bug exploration notebook. Here’s a few of my key findings.


After a drop in bug reports in F32, F33 had about as many bug reports as F31. This is reflected in both bugs marked as duplicate and non-duplicate bugs.

Bug reports coming from abrt recovered to roughly the historical average after a surprisingly low F32.

We fixed roughly the same amount of F33 bugs as in the last few releases. But with the increase in overall bugs, that means we left more unfixed bugs this time around. The dramatic increase in bugs closed EOL reflects this.

The good news is that we are getting faster at fixing the bug reports that we do fix.

New graphs!

I re-downloaded the historical data to add some additional fields. This allowed me to take a look at a few areas we hadn’t examined previously.


The first area I wanted to look at is the number of bugs tagged as being security-related. Fedora Linux 33 had the highest count of security bugs, with over 1200. Looking at the graph, there’s a big jump between F26 and F27. This suggests a process change. I’ll have to check with Red Hat’s product security team to see if they have an explanation.

The good news is that we’re fixing more security bugs than we’re not. The bad news is that the proportion of security bugs going unfixed is increasing. To be more correct, more bug reports are not marked as fixed. Security fixes often come in upstream releases that aren’t specifically tied to a Bugzilla bug.

Like with other bug reports, we’re fixing security bugs fixed faster than in the past. 50% of security bugs are resolved within about two weeks.

QA processes

I also wanted to look at how our QA processes are reflected in the bugs. During discussion of an F35 blocker candidate, Adam Williamson commented that it seemed like we were being looser in our interpretation of release criteria lately. In other words, bugs that would not have been blockers in the past are now. The numbers bear this out. While the number of both accepted and rejected blockers is down significantly from F19, there’s a general upward trend in accepted blockers from F30.

We have a big increase in accepted freeze exceptions recently. In fact, it looks exponential. Interestingly, the number of rejected freeze exceptions are roughly the same in that time.

Finally, I was curious to see if our use of the common bugs mechanism has changed over time. It has: we mark far fewer bugs compared to five+ years ago. I will be interested to see if the experiment that uses Ask Fedora to handle common issues changes the trends at all. We’ll have to wait until May 2023.


The graphs are pretty, but what do they mean? We have to be careful to draw too deep of conclusions. What’s in Bugzilla represents bug reports, not necessarily bugs. Some reports aren’t actual bugs and some bugs don’t have reports. And there’s a lot of “why” that we can’t pull from a summary analysis.

That said, it’s clear that we’re getting more bug reports than we can handle. Some of these should properly be filed upstream. How can we improve on the rest? We can’t do it all at once, but perhaps by working on some subset, we can make improvements. The one that jumps out to me is the security bugs. Can we bring more attention to those? I’ll spend the holiday break thinking about how to make them more visible so that they’re fixed or handled more quickly.

In the meantime, I’d love to hear your ideas, too. If you’d like to examine the data for yourself, everything is in the fedora-bug-data repo.


Security bugs are always a good idea to work on. Are there any other Fedora project objectives that closing certain bugs would help to achieve? What is the Red Hat perspective on it?

Without looking at all of the unfixed bugs, it’s hard to say a specific area of focus. In general, bugs that affect our Editions (Workstation, Server, IoT) in their default configuration are important because they affect the broadest group of users. That’s a very broad category, though, and may be too broad to be useful.